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The Gender Earnings Gap in Australia:  




Over the 1990s there have been a number of significant transformations 
in the Australian labour market, many of them likely to affect female 
relative earnings.  This paper examines the impact of changes in the 
regulatory industrial relations systems on gender earnings inequality. 
The paper begins with an overview of the regulatory development in the 
various State and Federal jurisdictions. This analysis is followed with a 
short discussion of why decentralised wage fixing may fail women. The 
remainder of the paper offers new empirical insight into Australian 





It is an established fact that female pay “... is influenced more by the overall system of 
pay determination than by the specific policies for gender equality” (Rubery, 1992: 
619).  The more centralised the system, the more equitable the outcomes (Blau and 
Kahn, 1992; Whitehouse, 1992; Gregory and Daly, 1990). The latter arises as a result 
of policies which compress the wage structure and raise the bottom of the wage 
distribution, thus indirectly benefiting women (given their preponderance in low wage 
jobs).  It may also be attributed to  enforcement mechanisms provided by unions and 
inspectorates under the institutional framework of centralised wage fixing (Bennett, 
1994). 
 
Throughout most of this century Australian wage fixing has been highly centralised. 
The establishment of wages and wage relativities has, primarily, been the domain of 
industrial tribunals and females have, at significant moments, benefited from the 
arrangements.  The significant narrowing of the gender pay gap following the 
landmark 1969 and 1972 equal pay cases has, for example, been attributed to the 
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prevailing system of compulsory arbitration (Gregory and Duncan, 1981; and Kidd 
and Meng, 1997). 
 
Since the late 1980s/early 1990s, there has been a gradual move away from arbitration 
as provisions for decentralised bargaining have become available. Such 
transformations have occurred in various State and Federal jurisdictions, although the 
timing and precise nature of the reforms implemented have varied. Jurisdictions 
implementing radical reforms are typically those where conservatives hold the balance 
of power (e.g. Victoria in 1992, Western Australia in 1993, and Federally in 1996). 
 
Given the demonstrated importance of centralised wage fixing for female pay and the  
increasing retreat from arbitration it becomes pertinent to ask “what has happened to 
female relative pay?”  Put differently, “What has been the impact of changes in the 
regulatory systems on the gender earnings gap?”  This paper addresses these questions 
through an analysis of ABS time-series and cross-sectional data. It begins, first, with 
an overview of the regulatory developments in each of the industrial jurisdictions. 
This analysis is followed with a short discussion of why decentralised wage fixing 
may fail women. The remainder of the paper offers new empirical insight into 
Australian gender earnings differentials via a disaggregated State analysis.   
 
 
Regulatory Developments  
 
Since the late 1980s compulsory arbitration in Australia has been in retreat (Deery, 
Plowman and Walsh, 1998). During the initial retreat phase (1987 to 1991) the 
devolvement of bargaining arrangements to the enterprise and workplace level was via 
a series of ‘managed’ steps (McDonald and Rimmer, 1989).  In the Federal 
jurisdiction (and in State jurisdictions following general orders to flow Federal 
decisions through) key wage fixing principles guiding the process included the 
Restructuring and Efficiency Principle (REP), the Structural Efficiency Principle 
(SEP), the Enterprise Bargaining Principle (EBP).  Under the REP a two-tier wages 
system was introduced, with the first tier allowing for a national wage adjustment and 
the second based on productivity trade-offs. The SEP retained a two-tier wages system 
3 
 3
but extended the negotiation guidelines to encourage workplace reform (commonly 
referred to as award restructuring). As part of this process the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC) instigated a Minimum Rates Adjustment (MRA) 
process designed to establish a rational structure of award wage relativities as a 
necessary "...prerequisite to a more flexible system of wage fixation"  (1991/10 CAR 
722, p.723). The MRA process commenced in August 1989 and was scheduled for 
completion by August 1991 (Print J9042). In reality several reviews continued beyond 
that date.   
 
In October 1991, following mounting pressure to further decentralised the system, the 
AIRC 'begrudgingly' introduced the Enterprise Bargaining Principle (EBP) 
(Dabscheck (1997). Although designed to further devolve wage negotiations, the strict 
requirements of the EBP limited the attractiveness of enterprise bargaining.  In 1992, 
to facilitate and further promote enterprise bargaining the Commonwealth 
Government amended the Industrial Relations Act 1988 and introduced a new 
division (Division 3A) on certified agreements. More significant amendments were 
subsequently made to the Act via the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 (and 
subsequent legislation, discussed below).   
 
Around the same time various State governments also enacted legislative reforms 
designed to encourage more decentralised bargaining. Reflecting differing political 
landscapes, early State reforms tended to be more radical than those pursued 
Federally. In Victoria, for example, non-union bargaining was encouraged under the 
Employee Relations (ER) Act 1992.  The ER Act also abolished State awards and 
replaced them with a set of 'minimum conditions', thus allowing employers significant 
scope in formulating their own employment arrangements (Erwin, Iverson and 
Buttigieg, 1994: 457). The effect of the Act was to encourage many unions (and thus 
employees) to shift to the Federal jurisdiction in search of better protection.  In 
December 1996 the Victorian government completed this move to the Federal 
jurisdiction when it ceded its industrial relation powers to the Commonwealth via the 
Commonwealth Powers (Industrial Relations) Act 1996.  The Federal government 
amended the Workplace Relations Act 1996 to effect the Victorian transfer (for more 




In Western Australia, prior to 1993, the main Act governing industrial relations 
regulation was the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA).  In December 1993 three Acts 
were introduced in the State to effect radical industrial relations reform. They included 
the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1993 (WA), the Minimum Conditions of 
Employment Act 1993 (WA) and the Workplace Agreements Act 1993 (WA) ('WAA'). 
Of the three pieces of new legislation introduced the WAA was (and is) the most 
significant. Under this Act employers may 'opt-out' of conciliation and arbitration and 
enter into individual agreements (i.e. as between an employer and an employee 
directly). Agreements under this stream are approved by the WA Commissioner of 
Workplace Agreements (whereas industrial agreements (i.e. collective unionised 
agreements) continue to be ratified by the WA Industrial Relations Commission). The 
no disadvantage test against which individual agreements are assessed is the 
Minimum Conditions of Employment Act.1  Since 1993 there have been two further 
'waves' of legislative amendments. Each have met with weeks of industrial unrest and 
each has focussed on the curtailment of union activity. (For more details on the WA 
arrangements see Ford (1996) and on second and third wave reforms see Bailey and 
McAtee ( 1999) and Bailey and Horstman (1999)). 
 
The WA Act may be seen as a fore-runner for subsequent industrial relations reform 
introduced to the Federal jurisdiction in November 1996 (i.e. the Workplace Relations  
Act 1996). As with the WA system, this Federal Act allows for collective and 
individual agreements.  The provisions for individual bargaining are contained in Part 
VID of the Act -  Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). AWAs reached under 
the Act are approved by an Employee Advocate which is separate from the AIRC.  As 
with the individual agreements in WA (and elsewhere), AWAs are private documents.  
The benchmark against which the no-disadvantage test is conducted is the relevant 
award. However, as awards are stripped back, the effectiveness of awards as a 
protective provision is brought into question. 
 
In the Federal jurisdiction the regulation of industrial relations is limited via the 
constitution (see Gardner and Palmer (1997) or Deery, Plowman and Walsh (1998) for 
a discussion of the constitutional constraints).  In seeking to extend the influence of 
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the Federal jurisdiction the Federal Government has thus sought 'harmonisation'. That 
is, the Federal government has requested that State governments hand over industrial 
relations powers.  Thus far only two States have fully harmonised their arrangements. 
They include Victoria (as noted above) and Queensland (via the Workplace Relations 
Act 1997 (QLD)).  As with the Federal Act the Queensland Act restricts the 
jurisdiction of the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission (QIRC) to allowable 
matters and allows for parties (employers and employees) to opt-out of the system. 
Individual agreements negotiated in this jurisdiction are filed with an Employment 
Advocate and approved by an Enterprise Commissioner.  Prior to 'harmonising' their 
arrangements Queensland introduced an amendment Act in 1994 which, at that time, 
was designed to bring the system into alignment with the changes in the Federal 
Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993. (For more on the Queensland legislation see 
Coulthard, 1998). 
 
Other States which similarly provide for non-union agreements are South Australia 
and Tasmania.  In South Australia the provisions are contained in the Industrial 
Relations and Employee Relations Act 1994 and agreements are approved by the 
Enterprise Bargaining Division of the Commission (Alexander and Lewer, 1998: 246).  
 
In Tasmania the relevant  legislation includes the Industrial Relations Act 1984 (Tas), 
the Industrial Relations Amendment (Enterprise Bargaining and Workplace Freedom) 
Act 1992 and the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 1997.  The reforms introduced 
since 1993 provide for non-union agreements. Other changes include the abolition of 
preference and closed shop practices and restricted rights of entry for union officials 
(Otlowski, 1994). Agreements made in the Tasmanian jurisdiction are registered with 
the Enterprise Commissioner. The Commissioner is not required to conduct a no-
disadvantage test. Agreements must, however, comply with certain statutory 
requirements, including legislated minimum wage rates (although it has been 
suggested that the minimum's are unrealistically low) (see Otlowski for further 
details).  
 
The only State not to provide for non-union bargaining is New South Wales reflecting 
the government’s “... philosophical commitment to the centrality of the award system” 
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(Buchanan, Woodman, O'Keeffe and Arsovska, 1998: 106). In a similar vein New 
South Wales is the only system which does not restrict agreements to the enterprise or 
workplace level (Gardner and Palmer, 1997). That is, agreements may be multi-
employer and parties to agreements may be peak union or employer bodies (ibid., 
p.205).  In New South Wales the arbitration tribunals and unions continue to play an 
important role in the shaping of wage outcomes. 
 
Decentralised Bargaining and Pay Equity 
 
In the introduction to this paper it was noted that the system of pay determination is a 
crucial determinant of female outcomes.  International evidence shows that gender 
wage inequality is a world-wide phenomenon, although the gaps tend to be smaller in 
centralised systems (Blau and Kahn, 1992 and 1996). Drawing on a study of equal pay 
in Germany, Italy and the UK undertaken for the Equal Opportunities Unit of the 
European Commission Rubbery finds that “.. women’s pay position is influenced 
more by the overall system of pay determination than by the specific policies for 
gender equality ...” (1992: 619). Whitehouse (1992), following an analysis of 13 
OECD countries, similarly concluded that centralised wage fixing arrangements were 
associated with high relative female earnings. 
 
Why might decentralised bargaining fail women?  The general argument is that 
relative to men women are in a weaker bargaining position because: (a) they are more 
concentrated in lower status jobs and occupations; (b) are more concentrated in part-
time and casual employment; (c) have lower levels of union membership and (d) are 
more likely to avoid aggressive behaviour associated with negotiating better terms and 
conditions (Wooden, 1997). 
 
A number of Australian based empirical studies lend credence to some of these 
arguments.  Wooden (1999) and Pocock and Alexander (this volume), for example, 
show that occupational and industry segregation imposes a significant penalty on the 
earnings of both males and females in highly feminised jobs.  Across industries, 
females employed in highly feminised occupations earn around six per cent less than 
their female counterparts in highly male dominated industries (Wooden, 1999: 165). 
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(These results hold after controlling for differences in the skills and other productivity 
characteristics of the sample).  Amongst males the equivalent penalty is greater, equal 
to around 18 per cent.  That is, males employed in a highly feminised job (e.g. 
nursing) will earn around 18 per cent less than other men with identical characteristics 
who are employed in male dominated jobs. 
 
Focussing on the issue of part-time employment (much of which is undertaken on a 
casual basis) available research shows that: (a) part-time workers are less likely to be 
found at workplaces covered by enterprise agreements; and (b), within workplaces 
part-timers are sometimes excluded from agreements (Short, Romeyn and Callus, 
1994)2.  The resultant effect of such exclusionary practices is a gap between the 
earnings of part-timers and full-timers. This also shows up in the earnings gap of 
around six per cent between casual and permanent employees, even in th epresence of 
an award based casual loading entitlement (Wooden, 1999:165).   
 
Gender differences also emerge in studies examining the outcomes of enterprise 
bargaining.  Reiman (1998), for example, examined the male-female pay gap of 
workers covered by an enterprise agreement and those not covered. He found that the 
gender pay gap was greater in the bargaining group than in the non-bargaining (award 
dependent) group. Consistent with other international studies (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 
1996), Reiman's study suggests that decentralised bargaining introduces greater wage 
inequality and thus a larger gender wage gap. 
 
The remainder of this paper explores the link between decentralised bargaining and 
gender wage inequality. Specifically the following hypothesis is tested: the more 
deregulated the labour market, the greater the gender wage gap. 
  
 
The State of Pay: ABS Time-Series Data 
 
In this section we present data on the average weekly ordinary time earnings 
(AWOTE) for full-time adults (seasonally adjusted). The data are drawn from 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Average Weekly Earnings, States and Australia 
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(Cat. No. 6302).  There are, however,  limitations associated with these data. The 
series, for example, is unable to separately identify earnings growth by agreement 
coverage (e.g. award, collective or individual).3 Similarly, it is impossible to 
differentiate the jurisdictional coverage. Workers within a State may be covered by 
either the relevant State jurisdiction or the Federal jurisdiction (where industrial 
powers have not been ceded to the Federal level). There is, however, a gender effect 
with respect to State and Federal coverage. Historically sectors such as health and 
education (female dominated areas) were denied Federal coverage on the grounds that 
they were not industries. State awards thus tend to dominate such industries.  Table 1 
below shows the inter-industry distribution of males and females in 1996 along with 
figures on State Award coverage for a similar time period.  From these data it is 
apparent that females are more likely than males to come under the coverage of a State 
jurisdiction. For example, in 1996 16.4 per cent of all female employees were in the 
Health industry; 81 per cent of workplaces in this industry were covered by State 
Awards. 
 
Table 1: Inter-Industry Distribution of Employment and Award Coverage Data, 
1995/96 
 Inter-industry Distribution 
of Employment(a)  (%) 
% of Workplaces 
in Industry Covered 
by State Award(b)
Industry Female Male 
   Agriculture, forestry, and fishing  3.5 6.1 -
   Mining 0.4 1.6 (55)
   Manufacturing  8.4 17.3 27
   Electricity, gas and water  0.3 1.2 51
   Construction  2.2 11.1 38
   Wholesale trade  4.3 7.2 53
   Retail trade 17.5 12.9 58
   Accommodation, cafes and restaurants  5.9 3.5 47
   Transport and storage 2.5 6.5 43
   Communication services 1.5 2.3 0
   Finance and insurance 4.9 2.9 20
   Property and business services  10.2 9.5 65
   Government administration and defence  4.4 4.5 56
   Education  10.9 4.3 86
   Health and community services  16.4 3.8 81
   Cultural and recreational services  2.6 2.0 (51)
   Personal and other services  4.2 3.3 86
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Notes:  
(a) the industry employment data are for the period August 1996 and are from ABS Labour Force Australia, (Cat. 6203). 






Whilst these difficulties with the AWOTE data make it difficult to directly test the 
hypotheses that women fare better in more regulated labour markets, it should be 
noted that there is no data set able to overcome these difficulties. 
 
 
Within State Gender Pay Gaps 
 
Figure 1 below plots within State gender pay gaps over the period August 1991 to 
May 1999.4  The data show that in May 1999 the Australian female/male earnings 
ratio was equal to 83.7 per cent, translating to an earnings gap of 16.3 percentage 
points. In Western Australia the gap was significantly higher (equal to 22 percentage 
points). Elsewhere there was no significant difference in the gender-wage gap across 
the States.  
 
 
Over the period August 1991 to May 1999 there was no significant change in the 
gender wage gap nationally and within the States of New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and Tasmania.  However, within Western Australia and South Australia 
female relative earnings declined significantly.  In Western Australia the gap widened 
by 4.4 percentage points. In South Australia the equivalent change was 5.8 percentage 
Figure 1
Female/Male Wage Realtivities, By State, 1991 to 1999



































































































































































points, moving from a starting base of 10.3 percentage points. (In both cases the 
change was significant at the five per cent level or better).  
 
In terms of timing, it is interesting to note that in Western Australia much of the 
change occurred prior to the introduction of the Workplace Agreements Act (WAA). 
The fastest growth occurred over the period November 1992 to November 1993, 
during which time the gap widened by 4.5 percentage points (from 18.4 percentage 
points to 22.9 percentage points).  The WAA did not, however, halt the decline. 
Indeed, between November 1993 and November 1994 the gap increased by a further 
1.3 percentage points to 24.2 percentage points.  Since November 1993 there has been 
no significant change in the WA gender wage gap. 
 
In South Australia the biggest decline occurred between November 1994 and May 
1996. During this period the SA gender wage gap grew by 7.2 percentage points (from 
9.8 to 17.0 percentage points). In the period since May 1996 there has been no 
significant change in the SA gender wage gap. 
 
On the basis of these data it is difficult to accept the hypothesis that labour market 
deregulation causes a deterioration in female/male relative pay. In Western Australia 
the gap has grown, although much of it occurred prior to the implementation of radical 
industrial reforms. In South Australia the deterioration in the gap there similarly 
occurred during a period of moderate deregulation. Elsewhere, even where radical 
reforms have been introduced (e.g. Victoria) the gap has remained unchanged. 
 
As indicated above, the weak empirical support for the hypothesis may reflect, in part, 
the difficulties of differentiating jurisdictional effects in the data. In Victoria, for 
example, the Federal jurisdiction has historically had greater coverage than in States 
such as Western Australia (Deery and Plowman, 1985: 128).  Thus, the insignificant 
effects in Victoria over the early 1990s may reflect the more moderate Federal system 
effects. 
 
Alternatively, it may be that the determinants of male and female earnings are similar 
in which case males and females have both been adversely affected by industrial 
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reforms in the various States.  To examine this latter proposition in more detail we 
plot female average earnings in each State relative to female National average 
earnings (Figure 2). Similarly, we also plot male average earnings in each State 
relative to male National average earnings (Figure 3).  As with Figure 1 the results 
reveal some interesting patterns. 
 
 
State Female Average Earnings Relative to National Female Average Earnings 
 
Against the National average, Figure 2 shows that the only State showing a significant 
increase in female relative earnings over the 1990s was New South Wales. In 
Queensland the relativity remained unchanged and in all other States (Victoria, South 
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State Male Average Earnings Relative to National Male Average Earnings 
 
Figure 3, which plots male relative earnings, shows that against the National average, 
males in New South Wales have made significant gains.  In Queensland, South 
Australia and Western Australia there has been no significant change in male relative 
earnings. In Victoria and Tasmania male relative earnings have, over the 1990s, fallen 
significantly relative to the National average. In Victoria the gap grew by 1.9 





What interpretations may we place on these results?  Bearing in mind the caveats 
already noted (such as the potential for Federal arrangements to be impacting on State 
outcomes), it should also be pointed out that the above analysis does not control for 
the differential economic climates in the various States.  That being said, it is clear 
that workers (males and females) in New South Wales have made significant gains 
over the 1990s. Furthermore, it is notable that New South Wales is the only 
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In Victoria and Tasmania, where radical industrial reforms have been introduced, both 
males and females have, over the 1990s, experienced a significant decline in their 
earnings relative to national averages.  Because both sexes have experienced slower 
earnings growth relative to the national average the gender gap within each State has 
remained unchanged. 
 
In Western Australia and South Australia, when compared to National rates, male 
relative earnings have remained unchanged over the period 1991 to 1999, while 
female relative earnings have declined.  The net effect of these divergent trends has 
been a widening gender wage gap within these States. 
 
In concluding this section it would seem that there is some support for the argument 
that labour market deregulation results in a deterioration in female relative pay 
outcomes.  When compared against female outcomes in more regulated jurisdictions 
(e.g. New South Wales) female outcomes in deregulated States such as Victoria, 
Tasmania and Western Australia are significantly lower. In the following section we 
use cross-sectional data to further explore the determinants and size of State based 
gender wage gaps. 
 
 
The State of Pay: ABS cross-sectional Data (1996) 
 
Any attempt to explain relative earnings differentials between males and females 
needs, firstly, to be able to explain as fully as possible, factors important in why 
individual workers earn more or less than some average amount.  In the economics 
literature the predominant framework for doing this is human capital theory. The basic 
idea here is that individuals who invest in improving their job skills through, for 
example, undertaking a certificate or degree course, or undertaking some formal off-
the-job training, should earn a higher income than an individual with much the same 
characteristics, but who has not undertaken such education or training. Similarly, other 
things equal, an individual with more relevant work experience should earn more.  




earnings = f(highest education attainment, training, experience) 
 
This model says that earnings are expected to be higher the higher is the measured 
education,  training level and experience level of an individual. 
 
Using regression analysis this model may be fitted to data on earnings, education, 
work experience and other characteristics known to affect earning outcomes (e.g. 
industry and occupation of employment as well as demographic characteristics such as 
marital status, presence of dependant children and birthplace). 
 
The results will show, on average, how much extra an individual can expect to earn by 
undertaking, for example, a degree qualification.  Comparisons are made to similar 
individuals who have not undertaken such training (e.g. individuals who did not 
complete high school).  Using these quantitative techniques we are also able to 
empirically estimate whether, for example, males are receiving a higher return on their 
investments in education than females. Similarly, we can study whether or not 
employers reward levels of work experience at a higher level for males than females.   
 
Following a procedure proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) regression 
results may also be used to decompose the gender pay gap into two components: an 
explained component and an unexplained component.5  The former arises because 
males and females are in possession of different 'productivity' characteristics (e.g. skill 
level, experience level, education level, and industry of employment). The latter 
measures the extent to which equivalent productivity characteristics are differently 
rewarded depending on whether or not the person is a male or female.  It measures the 
extent to which women's skills are undervalued (i.e. it measures discrimination).6 
 
Most Australian studies utilising the Blinder/Oaxaca decomposition procedure find 
that less than a quarter of the male-female pay gap arises because of explained factors. 
The corollary of this is that around three quarters of the gap occurs as a result of pay 
discrimination (see Chapman and Mulvey, 1986; Kidd and Shannon, 1996; Preston, 
1997).  After deducting the explained portion from the total wage gap, researchers 
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find an unexplained (discriminatory) wage gap of between 8 per cent (Reiman, 1998) 
and 14.5 per cent (Preston, 1997).7 
 
Data 
In this paper the 1996 Australian Census data is used to estimate separate male and 
female wage equations at the State level; these are then used to decompose the gender 
wage gaps.  The data are drawn from the one per cent public use 1996 Census 
Household Sample File.  In keeping with most studies in this field our sample is 
restricted to full-time wage and salary earners aged between 16 and 64 years old. 
Appendix A provides details on the data and variables used. There are 26,370 males 




Separate male and female wage equations were estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). (The dependent variable in all cases is the natural logarithm of weekly 
earnings). White's (1980) technique was used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  The 
male and female regression results are reported in Appendix B.  Table 2 below 
summarises the decomposition results. 
 
Table 2: 
Decomposing Australian Gender Wage Gaps: National and State Based Estimates, 
1996 
 Australia NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS
Explained Gap 0.051 0.050 0.041 0.063 0.013 0.085 0.006
  Human capital 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.018 0.004 0.022 0.018
  Demographics 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.009
  Overtime 0.033 0.034 0.028 0.030 0.031 0.038 0.026
  Public -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.011 -0.006 -0.008
  Metro -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -
  Industry 0.023 0.024 0.008 0.030 0.012 0.042 0.015
  Occupation -0.019 -0.020 -0.009 -0.022 -0.029 -0.020 -0.055
   
Unexplained Gap 0.141 0.133 0.135 0.151 0.159 0.176 0.171
   
TOTAL GAP 0.192 0.183 0.176 0.214 0.172 0.261 0.178
Note: The regression model controlled for one digit industry and occupation.   
 
 
The last row of Table 2 details the total gender wage gaps in each State. National 
results are also provided for comparison purposes.  The gaps vary considerably in size, 
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from 17.2 percentage points in South Australia to 26.1 percentage points in Western 
Australia.  These gaps may be termed 'raw' wage gaps. They measure the gender wage 
gap before any attempt has been made to control for factors which may account for 
their presence (e.g. industry and occupational distribution, differences in education 
and experience levels across the sexes).   
 
The first row of Table 3 measures the 'explained' gender wage gaps.  It is apparent 
from this that a large component of the WA gap (8.5 percentage points) can be 
explained by differences in the productivity characteristics of males and females in the 
WA sample.  In Queensland a large component (6.3 percentage points) of the gender 
wage gap in that State may similarly be accounted for by differences in the 
characteristics of males and females.  In both these States the main factors 
contributing to this explained portion were differences in the industry structure of 
employment (with more males employed in higher paying industries), differences in 
overtime work (more males working overtime) and differences in human capital 
(males more qualified and experienced than females).  Indeed, the industry results 
show that throughout Australia differences in the industrial composition of female and 
male employment partly explains the gender wage gap.  Nationally, just under half  
((0.023/0.051)*100 = 45%) of the explained component arises from industry 
employment differences.  Around two thirds of the explained component arises from 
sex based differences in overtime work (with males more likely to work overtime).  
Interestingly, one factor helping to reduce the gap is the occupational composition of 
the workforce.  Consistent with many other Australian studies (e.g. Kidd and Viney, 
1991; Preston 1997) the occupational results in Table 2 show that if females had the 
same occupational distribution as males they would be paid less, not more.8 
 
After we deduct the explained gaps from the total (raw) wage gaps we are left with the 
residual or unexplained gap. As indicated earlier, this gap provides a measure of the 
extent to which males and females are rewarded differently for the equivalent 
characteristic. That is, it measures pay discrimination.  Nationally, the gender wage 
gap is 14.1 percentage points after we take into account differences in human capital, 
demographics, sector, industry and occupation of employment.  The gender wage gap 
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(as measured by this indicator) is lowest in New South Wales (13.3 percentage points) 
and highest in Western Australia (17.6 percentage points). 
 
In returning to the hypothesis - the more deregulated the labour market, the greater the 
gender wage gap - the results show that against NSW (the most 'centralised' State) 
there is no significant differences in the gender wage gaps of Victoria, Queensland 
and South Australia.  There is, however, a statistically significant difference in the 
gaps in Western Australia and Tasmania.  Taking into account the timing of the 
industrial reforms, the results thus lend some support to the hypothesis. 
 
New South Wales, as has been noted, is the most regulated of the States. Victoria has 
pursued a radical reform agenda, but as compared to most other States, a greater 
proportion of workers in Victoria come under the Federal jurisdiction. Prior to the 25th 
November 1996, the Federal jurisdiction was fairly regulated. Individual agreements, 
for example, were not permitted.  Over the 1990s Queensland and South Australia 
have also closely followed the Federal jurisdiction. Thus, in 1996 these two States 
were also fairly regulated.  Western Australia and Tasmania have, on the other hand, 
provided for individual bargaining since around 1993. It is thus noteworthy that, in 
1996, the only States to have a significantly higher gender wage gap are Western 
Australia and Tasmania. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
Since 1991 Australian institutional arrangements for pay determination at both State 
and Federal levels have undergone a number of transformations. In a series of 
legislative amendments, governments of all persuasions have sought to decentralise 
wage bargaining. However, while it is common to describe the processes in the 
various jurisdictions as 'enterprise bargaining', this label masks important differences 
in the institutional arrangements across Australia (Bennett, 1994). At one end of the 
spectrum there are the regulatory systems based on individualism (e.g. Western 
Australia). At the other end there are the collective systems (e.g. New South Wales).  
Arrangements in the Federal jurisdiction have largely been collectivist; however, since 
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l996, third party involvement has increasingly been circumscribed and more 
deregulatory proposals are currently under consideration. 
 
It was widely feared that women would lose out in the move towards a more 
decentralised system. Thus far the ABS time-series data shows that there has been no 
significant change in their relative earnings position at the natinal level. However, the 
analysis in this paper shows that at a disaggregated level there have been some 
divergent trends.  In Western Australia, for example, over the 1990s the gender wage 
gap has grown by 4.4 percentage points. Currently (May 1999) the unadjusted gender 
wage gap in that State is equal to 22 percentage points. 
 
In this paper a disaggregated state analysis was used to examine the hypothesis that 
the more deregulated the labour market the greater the gender wage gap. Due to data 
constraints the analysis concentrated on males and females employed full-time. Part-
timers (many of whom are causal) are likely to be particularly disadvantaged by labour 
market deregulation, thus the results shown here are only the 'tip-of-the-iceberg', so to 
speak.  Further, the analysis is slightly constrained by the fact that no data series is 
able to separately identify State and Federal jurisdictional effects.   
 
These caveats aside, the findings, in particular the cross sectional analysis using 1996 
data, provide some support for the hypothesis that labour market deregulation 
contributes to a growth in the gender wage gap. Two States pursuing individual 
bargaining prior to 1996 (Western Australia and Tasmania) have a wage gap which is 
significantly higher than that of New South Wales (the collectivist system). The 
results thus suggest that as more jurisdictions pursue regulatory systems based on 
individualism we are likely to see continued erosion of the relative pay position of 




Appendix A: Definition of Variables in the Regression Model. 
 
Variable Description 
(unqualified) did not complete high school (forms the omitted category) 
hschool Highest qualification (HQ) = high school 
cert HQ = certificate  
diploma HQ = diploma 
degree HQ = degree 
exp years of potential labour market experience  
otime =1 if works overtime 
(born OZ) born Australia (forms the omitted category) 
esb migrant, born in English speaking country 
nesb migrant, born in Non-english speaking country 
(never married) never married (forms the omitted category) 
married =1 married   
wsd =1 if widowed separated and divorced 
child =1 if has dependant child(ren) 
public =1 if employed in public sector 
metro =1 if lives in metropolitan area. 
  




Appendix B: Regression Results 
Table B1: Determinants of Earnings, by State, Females, 1996. 
 
 Australian Females NSW Females VIC Females QLD Females SA Females WA Females Tas Females 
 Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
constant 5.791 288.264 5.756 157.547 5.819 150.378 5.710 115.859 5.809 84.817 5.766 89.774 5.835 45.920 
hschool 0.061 6.221 0.053 3.012 0.045 2.301 0.075 3.397 0.037 1.057 0.068 2.437 0.017 0.313 
cert 0.115 9.717 0.129 6.322 0.106 4.360 0.113 4.135 0.040 0.918 0.069 1.935 0.083 1.253 
diploma 0.197 12.190 0.196 6.792 0.214 6.984 0.189 5.079 0.142 2.683 0.181 3.365 0.059 0.604 
degree 0.322 23.980 0.336 14.090 0.293 10.788 0.345 11.189 0.237 4.715 0.287 7.008 0.316 3.700 
exp 0.033 29.015 0.035 17.103 0.035 16.551 0.032 11.365 0.023 6.286 0.043 11.578 0.020 2.541 
exp2/100 -0.001 -23.948 -0.001 -13.705 -0.001 -14.504 -0.001 -9.713 0.000 -5.281 -0.001 -9.419 0.000 -2.294 
otime 0.102 13.865 0.110 8.607 0.120 8.119 0.087 5.119 0.087 3.358 0.058 2.550 0.114 1.845 
esb 0.018 1.666 0.030 1.496 0.030 1.200 0.034 1.346 0.042 1.359 -0.022 -0.983 -0.145 -2.145 
nesb -0.062 -6.480 -0.091 -6.270 -0.052 -2.829 -0.056 -1.723 -0.099 -2.125 -0.059 -1.802 0.189 1.739 
married 0.002 0.211 -0.003 -0.211 -0.007 -0.402 0.042 2.338 0.016 0.577 -0.019 -0.734 0.030 0.619 
wsd 0.017 1.636 0.033 1.869 0.030 1.376 0.008 0.315 0.012 0.322 -0.044 -1.390 0.129 1.903 
child -0.069 -7.785 -0.062 -4.161 -0.100 -5.443 -0.064 -3.053 -0.047 -1.400 -0.086 -3.143 -0.015 -0.262 
public 0.091 10.366 0.084 5.410 0.068 3.551 0.112 5.741 0.149 4.914 0.074 2.723 0.170 3.335 
metro 0.088 12.281 0.143 8.742 0.107 6.950 0.067 4.489 0.121 4.250 0.070 2.809 - - 
     
Adj R2 0.393  0.405 0.398 0.367  0.350 0.416 0.369  
mean lnY 6.267  6.307 6.274 6.198  6.212 6.234 6.165  
n 14059  4905 3550 2530  973 1320 284  
     





Table B2: Determinants of Earnings, by State, Males, 1996. 
 
 Australian  
Males 
NSW Males VIC Males QLD Males SA Males WA Males Tas Males 
 Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t Coef t 
constant 5.711 194.722 5.689 104.905 5.637 110.562 5.728 76.85 5.766 76.047 5.824 86.208 5.955 57.018 
hschool 0.057 6.651 0.049 3.242 0.074 4.154 0.057 3.056 0.063 2.287 0.052 2.079 0.045 0.976 
cert 0.145 16.852 0.136 9.009 0.164 8.929 0.126 6.818 0.172 5.996 0.135 5.380 0.158 3.445 
diploma 0.207 11.552 0.183 6.008 0.269 7.512 0.192 4.283 0.229 3.314 0.072 1.393 0.274 3.253 
degree 0.376 30.911 0.369 17.724 0.398 16.557 0.347 11.192 0.407 8.959 0.318 8.974 0.397 5.853 
exp 0.032 32.821 0.031 18.394 0.033 16.787 0.033 14.133 0.033 9.690 0.037 11.866 0.031 5.212 
exp2/100 -0.001 -26.67 -0.001 15.036 -0.001 13.714 -0.001 11.970 -0.001 7.667 -0.001 9.691 -0.001 -4.539 
otime 0.178 33.678 0.187 20.598 0.157 14.768 0.166 13.593 0.190 10.507 0.178 10.570 0.125 3.819 
esb 0.025 2.949 0.045 2.774 0.039 2.079 0.022 1.241 -0.014 0.563 -0.026 1.259 0.171 2.981 
nesb -0.088 -10.964 -0.104 8.167 -0.122 8.245 -0.068 2.593 -0.135 4.063 -0.042 1.467 -0.029 -0.323 
married 0.091 11.818 0.100 7.498 0.090 5.581 0.094 5.231 0.073 3.019 0.101 4.077 0.125 2.583 
wsd 0.050 4.675 0.004 2.139 0.077 3.412 0.032 1.283 0.007 0.208 0.065 2.087 0.078 1.31 
child 0.004 0.549 -0.013 1.109 0.013 1.004 0.002 0.154 0.027 1.147 0.025 1.181 0.017 0.429 
public 0.101 11.265 0.097 6.091 0.132 6.446 0.112 5.716 0.121 4.154 0.075 2.649 0.066 1.347 
metro 0.070 12.148 0.130 10.445 0.115 9.486 0.026 2.111 0.029 1.329 -0.012 0.595 - - 
     
Adj R2 0.418  0.429 0.422 0.412 0.407 0.410 0.420  
mean lnY 6.459  6.490 6.450 6.411 6.384 6.495 6.343  
n 26370  9064 6472 4833 2023 2592 630  
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1  For employees whose conditions are covered by an award at the time of entering to an 
agreement the no disadvantage test is the relevant award. This does not apply for new employees. 
2  Statistics from the Australian Bureau of Statistics show that at August 1998 44 per cent of 
females were employed part-time and of those working part-time more than half (55 per cent) worked 
on a casual basis. 
3  This point is also made by Heiler, Arsovsak and Hall (this volume). 
4  The selection of August 1991 as a benchmark period was on the basis that August 1991 was 
the target date for the completion of the MRA process designed to bring about a proper alignment of 
wage relativities (10 CAR 722: 723). 
5  For readers interested in the technical details the technique requires the estimation of separate 
male and female wage equations of the form ln   Y Vim m im m= +β β0  and ln   Y Vif f if f= +β β0  
where m and f denotes males and females, respectively.  Adopting the male wage structure as the non-
discriminatory norm the raw wage gap can be decomposed as follows:  
 
ln ln ( )  (   ) (   )Y Y V V Vm f m f m f m f m f− = − + − + −β β β β β0 0   
where V  is a vector of the means of the independent variables and B measures the rate at which the 
market values a particular characteristic.  The first term of the decomposition calculates the portion of 
the gap attributable to differences in the characteristics of males and females. The second component 
measures pay discrimination (and data deficiencies). 
6  A portion of this gap will also measure differences in the unobservable characteristics of the 
sexes (e.g. motivation) which have not been captured in the model.  It is difficult to say precisely what 
proportion of the residual will reflect pay discrimination and what proportion will reflect data 
deficiencies. However, recent research by Crockett and Preston (1999) shows that in the case of 
Western Australia, the unexplained gap was primarily the result of the pay discrimination factors. 
7  Other estimates within the range include: 9.2 per cent (Langford, 1995); 10.4 per cent 
(Rummery, 1992);  12 per cent (Kidd and Shannon, 1996); and 12.7 per cent (Miller, 1994). 
8  To some this result may appear counter-intuitive, since it is often argued that occupational 
segregation has forced women into a narrow range of low paid jobs, thus contributing to a widening 
gender earnings gap.  The result is, however, not at odds with this logic. It is an arithmetic result which 
shows that because a greater proportion of the female group as compared to the male group are in 
occupations which pay above average (male) wages (e.g. Health Professionals, Education Professionals, 
Business and Administrative Associate Professionals), the average wages of females would fall if they 
had the same occupational distribution as males. In other words, if the female group were distributed 
across occupations in the same way as males there would be a fall in the proportion of professional 
workers (e.g. nurses, teachers etc.) and a rise in the proportion of lower paid workers (e.g. trades, 
labourers and related workers), thus bringing down female average wages (on the basis of female rates 
currently paid to these groups) and contributing to a growth in the gender wage gap. 
 
